propositions. Nonetheless, the determination of what contemporary evolutionary economists embrace, rather than reject, remains to be addressed through formal inquiry. This paper fills that gap by providing a statistical analysis of the views of institutional economists. It also provides the basis for determining whether an institutional "school of thought" can be identified by the degree of consensus held by its members on specific propositions.
A Review of the 1990 Survey
In order to put the present survey into proper context, we first need to briefly review the results of a 1990 survey of the economics profession. Alston et al. [1992a Alston et al. [ , 1992b hereafter, "Alston"] sampled members of the Association for Evolutionary Economics (AFEE) as one of six groups of economists used to define the economics profession. As one would expect, the strong consensus identified by Samuelson, particularly with respect to standard, neoclassical, microeconomic propositions, continued to hold. But, for the first time in formal inquiry, the nature and degree of dissention between evolutionary and mainstream economists were documented by including a group of 150 AFEE members. Not surprisingly, based on standard statistical tests, the hypothesis of similar response distributions between AEA members and AFEE members was rejected on 32 of 40 propositions.^ Clearly, AFEE members reflected a strongly contrarian view.
The Present Survey and the Questionnaire
During summer 1992, a two-page questionnaire was sent to all 528 individuals on the 1992 mailing list of the Association for Evolutionary Economics. The two-volume work on evolutionary economics in the Journal of Economic Issues [September and December 1987 ] provided a reasonable backdrop against which to formulate propositions. Indeed, many of the propositions were taken directly or paraphrased from that collection of solicited papers. There were a total of 286 respondents for a high overall response rate of 54.2 percent.
Recipients were asked to indicate general agreement, neither agreement nor disagreement, or general disagreement with each of f 35 propositions. The degree of consensus was estimated using a measure of relative entropy {e)-a summary index derived from information theory-that ranges between 0 (perfect consensus) and 1 (no consensus). Relative entropy is defined as observed entropy divided by the maximum possible entropy for the number of outcomes considered, where entropy is the sum of the probability of a particular outcome multiplied by the log (base 2) of the probability, i.e., (-Zpi Iog2 pi). A relative entropy value of 1.0 would result if the respondents were equally distributed across the four response options (including no response as an option). Table 1 reports the distribution of responses, the entropy index, and tbe mean for each proposition (nonresponses are not shown). The mean is calculated by giving weights of 1, 2, and 3 to "generally disagree," "neither agree nor disagree," and "generally agree," respectively.
The degree of consensus among institutional economists was notably high. As can be seen in Table 1 , where the propositions are listed from the highest degree of consensus to the lowest, only 9 of the 35 propositions fail to have a majority of respondents choosing one of the two polar responses. Only two propositions have an entropy value of .80 or greater (e.g., relatively low consensus). This compares with 18 of 40 propositions among AEA member economists in the Alston survey with an entropy value above .80.^ It is important to note tbat the entropy index is nonlinear and, as a consequence, large changes in responses result in small changes in entropy. For example, compare proposition 18, with more than two out of three respondents generally agreeing, with proposition 26, where a near majority neither agree nor disagree, and there is little consensus one way or the other on the proposition. Nevertheless, the entropy values for these two propositions may appear to be only slightly different (.62 and .77, respectively) .
What, Then, Do AFEE Members Believe? Tool [1987, 955] argues that the difference between institutionalist and orthodox methodologies is nowhere more sharply delineated than in the discussion of human nature. Our survey supports that view. Thus, we find substantial agreement among AFEE members on a variety of propositions, which suggests that human nature evolves rather than being fixed. The proposition (no. 2) that "economic behavior of individuals is a consequence of Notes: In column 2, 1 = generally disagree, 2 = neither agree nor disagree, 3 = generally agree. In column 4, E = entropy. The responses do not sum to 100 percent due to rounding and because the "no" response category is not reported. enculturation rather than freely chosen tastes and preferences" may be anathema to neoclassical economists. They prefer to deal with utility maximization over a given and, presumably, freely chosen set of tastes and preferences. However, 84.6 percent of AFEE respondents agree with the proposition.
In the arena of public policy and social control of business we see a clear alternative to neoclassical laissez-faire arguments. Institutional economists flatly reject the conservative proposition that "even in situations characterized by extensive market failure, government activity will generally make the situation worse" (no. 1). They also reject the contention that "government's influence upon the economy should be limited to areas where government regulation or the public provision of goods is essential" (no. 17). Institutional economists recognize that "authority and control are inherent to all social and economic systems" (no. 6) and find several legitimate functions for the governmental exercise of that power. They overwhelmingly agree that "health care should be provided to all citizens by the government" (no. 10) and that "the U.S. needs an industrial policy based upon economic planning" (no. 16). Institutionalists do not, however, favor unlimited government. They reject the proposition that "a large federal budget deficit does not have meaningful eflfects . . . upon the economy" (no. 11) and tend to be relatively neutral to the proposition that "the level of government spending relative to GNP should be increased" (no. 28).
Doe8 AEA Membership Matter?
While only 1.2 percent of the total membership of the American Economic Association also hold membership in AFEE, a substantially greater proportion of AFEE members also belong to the AEA. Of the 286 respondents, 140 (49 percent) indicated membership in the AEA. This is very near the actual ratio of the membership of total AEA members to AFEE members, which we obtained by directly comparing mailing lists. Forty-seven percent of 1992 AFEE members were also listed in the 1991 directory of members of the AEA.
In the present survey, we compared the responses of AFEE members who are not members of AEA with those AFEE members who are. Based on a chi-squared test of significance, we rejected the proposition that AFEE co-membership in AEA matters on all but five propositions at the .05 significance level.^ The absence of substantial differences between AFEE member responses with and without co-membership in AEA in the present survey contrasts sharply with the results reported earlier with respect to differences between AFEE members and AEA members in the Alston survey. Therefore, we interpret these results to mean that AFEE membership is more revealing with regard to views held than is membership in AEA. For those with co-membership, AFEE appears to be the primary choice of affiliation; membership in AEA is secondary.
Institutionalists: A United Front!
Mark Blaug [1978, 710-713] suggested that the core of institutionalism rests on three methodological features: (1) dissatisfaction with neoclassical economics and orthodox price theoiy; (2) a call for interdisciplinary integration with other social sciences; and (3) rejection of casual empiricism. Blaug also argued that "despite certain common tendencies, the school of 'institutional economics' was never more than a tenuous inclination to dissent from orthodox economics. . .. [Nlothing exists today that could be described as an institutionalist movement in economics." Certainly, the results of the survey reported here suggest that the three common methodological elements of institutionalism mentioned by Blaug continue to this day. While it is also clear that there are differences as well as agreements, it is not unreasonable to argue, as did Tool [1987, 9531 , that the agreements "overwhelmingly exceed the [disagreements] and that [it might be possible to] present an integrated institutionalist theory of political economy."
Virtually no one would question the existence of a "Chicago School of Political Economy." As Warren Samuels [1976, 13] argued, "Chicago is not a school solely of economics ... or of economic science ... for it is self-admittedly (1) heavily infused with certain values and (2) directed at prescribing certain legaleconomic relations." We can use the degree of consensus among Chicagoans to provide a "benchmark" against which to compare consensus among institutionalists. The Alston survey used factor analysis to look for common patterns of response by groups of individuals across all 40 of the 1990 propositions. The dominant factor, using an unconstrained varimax rotation, had an eigen value of 10.02 and explains 25.1 percent of the variation. It shows correlation among politically conservative propositions and orthodox microeconomic propositions similar to those found in the earlier Kearl survey. Kearl labeled this factor the "Chicago School" phenomenon, and the authors of the Alston survey had "no reason to change the moniker" lAlston 1992b, 14]. Subsequent analysis of all nine respondents in the Alston survey who obtained their highest degree from the University of Chicago is even more convincing. (Interestingly, none of the AFEE respondents in the Alston survey were from the University of Chicago, even though each of the other five strata had a Chicagoan.) On three propositions in the Alston survey, the Chicago graduates were unanimous in their choice-entropy was zero, indicating perfect consensus. (No survey of economic opinions among economists that we know of has ever reported such a result.)^ Of the four propositions dealing with monetary propositions in the Alston survey, the average entropy was a very low .54, indicating a high degree of consensus among the Chicago group. (The average entropy for all respondents, in comparison, was .82.) For Chicagoans, the overall entropy on all 40 questions in the Alston survey was .58, again a very high degree of consensus. How do institutionalists compare?
We have shown that there is a high degree of consensus among AFEE members on a wide variety of propositions. Indeed, the average entropy level for all propositions on the 1992 survey of AFEE members is .63. Although the questions differed, this is exactly the same average degree of consensus among AFEE members on all propositions in the Alston survey. When we exclude AEA members from the 1992 survey, the average entropy falls to .51 for the five propositions with significant difference at the .05 level (see Note 3). This provides even stronger indication of a common perspective held by institutionalists. With the caveat that the entropy measure is not linear, these results are very close to the benchmark degree of consensus found for the Chicago School. In contrast, for other strata included in the Alston survey, the average entropy was AEA elite (.71), business economists (.73), other AEA members (.74), government economists (.75), and principles teachers (.76).
Our results do not prove that institutionalists form a school of thought "possessing a distinctive paradigm, a general metaphysical orientation or point of view, and a conceptual framework that influences the nature of the problems and types of questions it will consider and the terms of that consideration" [Samuels 1976, 6-7] .
The results suggest, however, that institutionalists are not merely voices of dissent; they present a united front.
Conclusion
Our survey clearly supports the claim made in the two volumes published in 1987 by the Journal of Economic Issues under the general title of Evolutionary Economics that "the institutionalist approach is essentially different from the orthodox neoclassical approach" [Tool 1987, 951] . The question remains, however, whether institutional economists can legitimately claim to offer a viable alternative to prevailing neoclassical orthodoxy. A substantial majority (55.6 percent) of AFEE members think that they do (no. 24). Perhaps the statement of one respondent who generally agreed with proposition 24 sums up the view of many respondents: "I'm not sure if any formulation is fully comprehensive, but, given that I do not think neoclassical theory is very useful, [the cujrent institutional formulation! is closer to the mark." Klein [1993] , who asserted the failure of the institutionalists to influence mainstream economics and contemporary textbooks. While we find Klein's thesis to be generally correct, the strong consensus among institutionalists on public policy propositions, together with Cobb's finding, suggests that heterodox economics may have made modest inroads into the principles curriculum. 5. Propositions 4, 7, 11, 23, and 32 were significant at the .05 level. Propositions 29, 30, and 33 were significant at the .10 level. Respondents also reported other affiliations. Those professional associations with 10 or more AFEE co-memberships include ASE (40), AFIT (27), EAEPE (20) , URPE (18), AAEA (15), IRRA (11), and EHA (11). A meaningful statistical comparison between these cross-memberships could not be done because of problems of minimum cell values. 6. They unanimously reject the propositions that (1) "wage price controls are a useful policy option in the control of inflation" and that (2) "the cause of the rise in gasoline prices that occurred in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is the monopoly power of the large oil companies." They unanimously accept the proposition that (3) "a ceiling on rents reduces the quantity and quality of housing available." In contrast, only 31.2 percent of AFEE members reject (1), only 41.0 percent reject (2), and only 39.0 percent accept (3), respectively.
